### LW Race K

#### The history of living wage legislation was founded upon eugenically minded progressivism that resulted in union exclusion and displacement of African Americans. Hutchinson 11

Harry G. Hutchison, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, “WAGING WAR ON “UNEMPLOYABLES”? RACE, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND MINIMUM WAGES: THE NEW EVIDENCE,” George Mason University Law and Economics, Research Paper Series, June 2011.

Finally, turning to the pseudo-scientific case for minimum wages, it should be noted that, during the early part of the twentieth century, “[m]inimum wage legislation passed by several states beginning with Massachusetts in 1912 was the sine qua non of progressive labor reform and progressive economist championed minimum wages.”138 Fostering this perspective was the work of eugenically-minded progressives who advocated “minimum wages precisely because binding minimums would cause job losses.”139 Tempted by the rather conventional deduction “that minimum-wage induced job loss was a social benefit because it performed the eugenic service of ridding the labor force of the “unemployable,”140 progressive hierarchs sought to remake the world by controlling wages and population growth. Influential British intellectuals Baron Sidney and Baroness Beatrice Webb deserve singular recognition for the success of this move. They observed: “‘With regard to certain sections of the population [the unemployable], this unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but actually of social health.’”141 Flaunting his talent for pulverizing rhetoric, Sidney Webb opined that “of all ways of dealing with these unfortunate parasites, the most ruinous to the community is to allow them unrestrainedly to compete as wage earners. . .”142 As members of the philosophic vanguard, obligated by a duty to protect deserving workers from the revolting menace of competition from “defectives” and the “unfit,” progressive architects yearned to make it illegal to work for less.143 Captured by this surging zeitgeist, Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, future president of the American Economic Association and a leading progressive economist, offered a clear social vision of what should happen to those who, even after remedial training, could not earn the legal minimum. Evoking H. G. Wells’ admonition, he stated: “if we are to maintain a race that is to be made up of capable efficient and independent individuals and family groups we must courageously cut off lines of heredity that have been proved to be undesirable by isolation or sterilization . . .” 144 Gleaming with racial animus, Progressive Era trade unionists used local ordinances controlling licensing and apprenticeship to keep blacks out of their trades or, in a concession to the humanity of African Americans, forced blacks into segregated auxiliary unions.145 Racial hostility, inescapably tied to union exclusion, flourished a decade later, as the Great Depression worsened and undesirable jobs, traditionally held by blacks, became attractive to whites.146 As a consequence of unionists’ tenacious surrender to racial hierarchy, the displacement of African American workers became a serious problem.147 This approach, grounded at the intersection of biology and the law, was not unique to the United States, as the history of pre-Mandela South Africa shows.148 White South African craft unionists like their American counterparts, demanded an exclusion of blacks that was consistent with the evolving tenets of a racial hierarchy betraying its progressive assumptions.149 Progressive aspirations metamorphosed into eugenic-tinged legislation, gender-specific wage regulation, and minimum wages. Whether within the United States or elsewhere, these various moves were designed to largely solve the problem of the “unemployables” by excluding and subjugating them. Thriving under the broad banners of biology and manifest destiny, these propositions sustained a shrewd calculus that led, as the next subsection shows, to labor law reform, which included federal as well as a growing number of state and local minimums.

#### Empirics prove that unionization defended exclusionary wage reform in the name of progress- living wages prop up the system that views African Americans as mentally inferior and only capable of performing low-wage jobs, masked as a “living” wage. Hutchinson 11

Harry G. Hutchison, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, “WAGING WAR ON “UNEMPLOYABLES”? RACE, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND MINIMUM WAGES: THE NEW EVIDENCE,” George Mason University Law and Economics, Research Paper Series, June 2011.

While labor unions thrived, this policy imposed costs on the overall economy that disproportionately disfavored members of marginalized groups.174 Taking advantage of the monopoly power granted to them by the NIRA and its minimum wage provisions, and conceiving of labor organizations as “white jobs trust,”175 labor unions displaced black workers.176 Coherent with the tenets of Public Choice Theory, exclusion is frequently defended in the name of progress yet actually incentivized by the naked self-interest of powerful groups.177 And, this ongoing process reified social stratification. As part of this course of action, the NIRA codified wage differentials in such a way that even when a black employee performed more important tasks than a white employee, he would frequently have a lower job classification and hence a lower wage than his white counterpart.178 Building on this exclusionary edifice, racist labor unions in both the South and North supported the establishment of a caste system that reserved unskilled, lowpaying jobs for African Americans and skilled high-wage jobs for whites.179 “The ideology that supported this system held that African Americans were mentally inferior and therefore incapable of performing these jobs.”180 “‘White labor constructed an ideology of white supremacy to secure and to justify their power and status in their places of work and in the community’ and [m]any rank-and-life union members adopted this ideology and came to believe that they were the white workingman’s vanguard against incursions by the darker races.”181 Inspired by this commanding imperative, and consistent with the fact that the architects of the New Deal knew that labor innovation “would create disproportionate unemployment among African Americans,”182 the minimum wage provisions of the NIRA eliminated the jobs of half a million blacks in less than a two year period.183 Building on this particularly pungent record, the enactment of the FLSA produced results that mirrored a similarly disastrous policy in apartheid-era South Africa.184 “The Labor Department determined that the FLSA caused between 30,000 and 50,000 workers, mostly Southern blacks, to lose their jobs within two weeks.”185 This result confirmed the inescapable linkage between minimum wages and the eugenic virtues of removing from employment those who are a burden on society.186 As leading progressive economist and future American Economics Association president A. B. Wolfe predicted eugenic objectives could be achieved by eliminating inefficient entrepreneurs through minimum wage regulation, resulting in the elimination of “ineffective” workers.187 In combination with other New Deal programs, minimum wage regulation conduced to a persistent decline in the African American employment rate, which is coherent with the deduction that democratic governments give the greatest benefits to those who are the best organized and the least disenfranchised—categories that include few blacks.188 Although minimum wage regimes exhibit prima facie neutrality,189 it is not difficult to show that labor cartels, sheltered by progressive labor ideology and minimum wage law, enforced a philosophy that decisively conceives of blacks and other minorities as inferior outsiders.190 It would therefore require legerdemain of epic proportions for the instantiation of this ideology to produce actual economic and social gains for vulnerable populations. Since evidence of heroic legerdemain cannot be found, it is quite easy to show that minimum wage regimes fulfilled the aspirations of early progressive innovators by controlling and disenfranchising the “undeserving” as part of an evolutionary move that ultimately reclassified them as “unemployable.” Hence, progressive architecture has justly earned a place of honor in America’s pantheon of racial subjugation despite the fact that the progressive establishment generally refused to defend its commitment to exclusionary labor regimes on explicitly racial terms.191 Now it is time to discover whether the new body of minimum wage research and the scholarship of Deakin and Wilkinson serve to destabilize this remarkable record of subordination that is unavoidably derived from Progressivism’s doctrinal assumptions and history of minimum wage advocacy in the United States.

#### Even with benign intentions, wage regulation is a form of institutionalized racism. Hutchinson 97

Harry Hutchison, Law Professor University of Detroit, 1997, "Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes," Harvard Journal on Legislation, Winter, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 93, p. 129-31

In light of the historical, empirical, and culturally informed evidence, a Critical Race reformist explication of minimum wages demonstrates that "legislation that regulates wages is an effective tool in a racist's arsenal," [n232](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n232) even when it lacks admitted racist intent. Such wage "regulation is effective because it enjoys the benefit of at least four powerful forces: (1) It evokes voluntary cooperation with the racist goals; (2) it gives the appearance of being racially neutral; (3) it is relatively cheap to enforce; and (4) it sometimes enjoys the political support of the people whom it is intended to victimize, as well as their benefactors." [n233](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n233) Wage regulation, properly deconstructed, constitutes a form of institutionalized racism.

Turns and outweighs the aff:

1. Their evidence doesn’t account for the historical legacies behind the living wage – its limited perspective makes it less equipped to predict effects accurately
2. Internal link turns their solvency – the living wage is tainted with exclusionary assumptions and endorses values of white supremacy
3. Masks the problem- living wages obscure their racist logics by claiming that unemployment is simply an unintended effect
4. Proves that the values endorsed by the living wage will get coopted – even if the aff has good intentions, it’ll fail
5. Actions by government elites will never help those structurally excluded by society – the state has overwhelming interest in maintaining status quo power relations.

#### *And, it’s not simply a racial issue- historically, the living wage has been grounded in preserving male-dominated families and gender roles. Levin-Waldman 05*

*Oren M. Levin-Waldman, Public Affairs Professor - Metropolitan College of New York, 2005, The Political Economy of the Living Wage: A Study of Four Cities, p. 43*

*Though the living wage was never precisely defined in dollar terms, it was thought that it should be high enough to enable a man to support a family. That is, there were attempts by several U.S. wage boards to define a living wage based on empirical studies at the time of what the estimated cost was of maintaining "working girls." Hence it became commonplace to equate the concept of a living wage with that of a family wage. For women in particular, the concept of a minimum wage would literally save them from a life of prostitution. A common argument for why women should receive minimum wages was that the minimum wage would better enable them to safeguard their morals. Among the twentieth-century reformers, Emile Hutchinson made the point that women's wages, which had long been low relative to men's, were of particular concern because of the relationship to morality issues. "It decides the girl's companionships, her amusements, her ability to gratify without danger her natural and reasonable tastes, her very capacity for resistance to temptation. Its physical effects open the way to moral dangers." Women who could not earn subsistence wages might find themselves pulled in the direction of prostitution, which at the time was not illegal. In a similar vein, social reformers argued for mothers' pensions -- forerunner to the AFDC program -- because these pensions would enable them to safeguard their morals while also caring for their children, which in the reformers' view was best done in the home. At the same time, these same social reformers were not feminists in contemporary terms. The language often used during this period in support of minimum wages for women was that of a "women's" wage, but relative to a living wage earned by men. Alice Kessler-Harris sums it up this way: "That men ought to be able to support wives and daughters implied that women need not engage in such support. They ought to be performing home duties. Thus if women earned wages, the normal expectation was that she did to supplement of other family wage earners."*

#### The alternative is to reject the aff advocacy to repudiate the racist legacy of the living wage and wage regulation.

#### Equal inclusion is a prerequisite to answering ethical questions- exclusion allows for the arbitrary imposition of viewpoints that precludes access to normative truths. Medina 11

Medina, J. (2011). Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism. Foucault Studies, 1(12), 9–35.

The central goal of this paper is to show the emancipatory potential of the epistemological framework underlying Foucault’s work. More specifically, I will try to show that the Foucaultian approach places practices of remembering and forgetting in the context of power relations in such a way that possibilities of resistance and subversion are brought to the fore. When our cultural practices of remembering and forgetting are interrogated as loci where multiple power relations and power struggles converge, the first thing to notice is the heterogeneity of differently situated perspectives and the multiplicity of trajectories that converge in the epistemic negotiations in which memories are formed or de-formed, maintained alive or killed. The discursive practices in which memory and oblivion are manufactured are not uniform and harmonious, but heterogeneous and full of conflicts and tensions. Foucault invites us to pay attention to the past and ongoing epistemic battles among competing power/knowledge frameworks that try to control a given field. Different fields—or domains of discursive interaction—contain particular discursive regimes with their particular ways of producing knowledge. In the battle among power/ knowledge frameworks, some come on top and become dominant while others are displaced and become subjugated. Foucault’s methodology offers a way of exploiting that vibrant plurality of epistemic perspectives which always contains some bodies of experiences and memories that are erased or hidden in the mainstream frameworks that become hegemonic after prevailing in sustained epistemic battles. What Foucault calls subjugated knowledges3 are forms of experiencing and remembering that are pushed to the margins and rendered unqualified and unworthy of epistemic respect by prevailing and hegemonic discourses. Subjugated knowledges remain invisible to mainstream perspectives; they have a precarious subterranean existence that renders them unnoticed by most people and impossible to detect by those whose perspective has already internalized certain epistemic exclusions. And with the invisibility of subjugated knowledges, certain possibilities for resistance and subversion go unnoticed. The critical and emancipatory potential of Foucaultian genealogy resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed. The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subjugated knowledges—that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges. 4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, genealogical investigations should aim at these insurrections, which are critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic insurrection requires a collaborative relation between genealogical scholars/activists and the subjects whose experiences and memories have been subjugated: those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to contestation. On the other hand, the scholars and activists aiming to produce insurrectionary interventions could not get their critical activity off the ground if they did not draw on past and ongoing contestations, and the lived experiences and memo- ries of those whose marginalized lives have become the silent scars of forgotten struggles.

#### You cannot detach theory from its history- ethics must be informed by the injustice of empirical institutions, because the assumptions behind abstraction defy reality and serve to legitimize oppression. Curry 13

Dr. Tommy J. Curry 13, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M, "In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical", 2013.

Despite the rhetorical strategies adopted by both Black and white political theorists which urge Blacks and whites alike to demand Americans to continue their allegiance to the foundational de-racialized ethos of the post-Civil Rights era, the reality of the American racism—its sheer recurring violence against Black people—demands more than symbolic rhetorical allusion. To seriously grasp the reality of racist oppression and the sempiternal machinations of anti-Blackness throughout American society be it in its institutions like the prison industrial complex, its policies like Affirmative action, or its manipulation of Black social degradation and economic disadvantage to support pathological theses about disasters like Katrina or cultural deviance as in the death of Trayvon Martin, Darius Simmons, or Jordan Davis, the study of the matter itself—racism—must be a study of a conceptual disengagement with the myth of racial equality and the “automatic progressivism” of the American liberal project. This disengagement is not simply the refusal to accept the idealism of civil rights myth held beyond the realm of fact, but the disengagement with the illusions of democracy and equality that continue to ignore the role that violence has played and continues to play in the subjugation, incarceration, and vilification of Black life. As Dr. A.J. William Myers reveals in his work groundbreaking work entitled Destructive Impulses, Until at such time white America (and Black America) is openly willing to confront a historical legacy of its own violence (perpetrated against an American people of color), any venture into and/ or expository on race relations becomes an exercise in futility…As a result, therefore, white violence, confined to the subliminal recesses of the American psyche, continues to prevent the transition necessary for the country to move beyond the idea of race. In America, Blackness and the racism that continues to condemn those historical racialized peoples is violence—it is the forceful and coercion enclosing of human beings to an inferior social, political, and economic status of which their own humanity exceeds. This dehumanizing relegation of the raced citizen is not a gradual or incremental debasement, but rather the historically immediate condition of inferiority that presents progress to be attainable by the cyclical degrees of physical violence against the racialized population. For these racially oppressed peoples, violence is the permanent fixture of existence in America, since it is the vitiation of their humanity that rationalizes the varying techniques of their cultural erasure, birthing the emergent symbolic associations of degradation that replace their invisibility, and empowering the intentional enforcements of their societal exclusions. In fact, it is precisely this triumvirate that gauges what we take to be the negation of the necessity of revolutionary change--since the raced is taken to be present, as a result of a critical redefining of humanity, integrated into society. The potentiality of whiteness—the proleptic call of white anti-racist consciousness— is nothing more than the fiat of an ahistorical dream. A command ushered before thought engages racism, before awareness of the world becomes aware of what is actual. This is forced upon accounts of racism where whiteness is morally obscured from being seen as is. [w]hiteness as is partly determined by what could be, since what is was a past potentiality—a could be. The appeal to the sentimentality, morality, the moral abstraction/distraction of equality—both as a political command and its anthropological requisite—complicate the most obvious consequence of anti-Black racism, namely violence. This moral apriorism urges the Black thinker to conceptualize racism as an activist project rooted in the potential of a world filled with non-racists, a world where the white racist is transformed by Black activity into the white anti-racist. But this project supposes an erroneous view of the white racist which occludes the reality of white supremacy and anti-Black racism. As Robert F. Williams argues in Negroes with Guns, “the racist is a man crazed by hysteria at the idea of coming into equal contact with Negroes. And this mass mental illness called racism is very much a part of the ‘American way of Life.’” The white racist is not seen as the delusional individual ostracized from society as a result of their abhorrent social pathologies of racist hate. Rather the white racist is normal—the extended family, the spouse, the sibling, the friend of the white individual—the very same entities upon which the inter/intrasubjectivity nexus of the white self is founded. The white [he] experiences no punishment for his longing for Black servitude and his need to exploit and divest the Black worker here and then of [his] wealth. The white [she] has no uneasiness about her raping of—the destruction of generations of Black selves—mothers, children, and men—and today usurps the historical imagery of “the nigger,” to politically vacate Blackness and demonize niggers as beyond political consideration. She rewrites history, pens morality, and embodies the post-racial civil rights subject. As such, racism, the milieu of the white racist is not the exposed pathological existence of the white race, but rather valorized in white individuality, the individuality that conceptualizes their racism as a normative aspiration of what the world should look like, and even more damning, an aspiration that can be supported and propagated in the world. The white racist recognizes the deliberateness of the structures, relations, and systems in a white supremacist society and seeks like their colonial foreparents to claim them as their own. Traditionally we have taken ethics to be, as Henry Sidgwick’s claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action.” This rational procedure is however at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue, as is often done, that the government, its citizens, or white people should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition. If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In ethical deliberations dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated. This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, the only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be anti-ethical, or a judgment refusing to write morality onto immoral entities.

#### The role of the ballot and judge as an educator is to reject arguments based on asymmetrical power relations—because pedagogical contexts are inherently political, we have a unique opportunity to promote real change. Trifonas 03,

PETER PERICLES TRIFONAS. PEDAGOGIES OF DIFFERENCE: RETHINKING EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE/ RoutledgeFalmer. New York, London. 2003. Questia.

Just as objective social reality exists not by chance, but as the product of action, so it is not transformed by chance. If men[/women] produce social reality (which in the “inversion of praxis” turns back upon them and conditions them), then transforming that reality is an historical task, a task for men[/women]. Reality which becomes oppressive results in the contradistinction of men[/women] as oppressors and oppressed. The latter, whose task it is to struggle for their liberation together with those who show true solidarity, must acquire a critical awareness of oppression through the praxis of this struggle. One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge men's[/women's] consciousness. Functionally oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. (36)In this passage we see the fundamental importance that Freire places on the development of a critical consciousness of social existence. An end to oppression, which is the fundamental objective of Freire's call for a socially transformative praxis, requires that men and women have the ability to perceive their existence in the world. He argues that their action in the world is largely determined by the way they see themselves within it, and that a correct perception necessitates of an ongoing reflection on their world. For Freire it is neither the mere action nor the mere reflection and critical consciousness of men and women that will transform the world and end oppression. This can only be achieved through “praxis: the action and reflection of men in the world in order to transform it” (66). The ability to perceive correctly and arrive at a critical consciousness of the world, however, does not come automatically; it is itself the product of praxis. From this position Freire argues for an educational practice (a pedagogical praxis) that engages with the oppressed in reflection that leads to action on their concrete reality. He calls for a pedagogy that makes oppression and its causes objects of a reflection that will allow the oppressed to develop a consciousness of “their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation” (33). Freire clearly articulates the essential importance of critical consciousness to transformative action that is liberating: In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action. (34) He attributes to education an essential role in the development of developing critical consciousness that Freire ascribes to education: In problem posing education, men and women develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves. They come to see the world not as static reality, but as reality in process, in transformation. Although the dialectical relations of men with the world exist independently of how these relations are perceived (or whether or not they are perceived at all) it is also true that the form of action men adopt is to a large extent a function of how they perceived themselves in the world. Hence the teacher-student and the student**s-**teachers reflect multaneously on themselves and the world without dichotomizing this reflection from action, and thus establish an authentic form of thought and action**.** (71) From Freire we understand that a social transformation that works in the interests of working-class indigenous and nonwhite peoples necessitates a critical consciousness of social existence and the possibility of its transformation. We argue that a critical decolonizing consciousness is fundamental to the transformation of the internal neocolonial condition of social existence in the contemporary United States. One need only consider the level of post-September 11 patriotism and expressed belief in official rhetoric (about America's moral righteousness and freedom loving and defending tradition) among working-class indigenous and nonwhite people to see the degree to which our internal neocolonial condition has “submerged” the consciousness of men and women who live and experience the effects of that condition on a daily basis. The vast majority of working-class indigenous and nonwhite people in the contemporary United States cannot see the extent to which the essence of the colonialism that made them English-speaking, Christian individuals continues to define their social existence. We agree with Freire that how men and women act in the world is largely related to how they perceive themselves in the world, and thus we understand that the existent potential to transform our internal neocolonial condition will remain unrealized if we fail to appropriately perceive and develop a critical consciousness of this condition and its possible undoing. A social transformation that ends our neocolonial oppression and exploitation in American society will require a cycle of emancipatory thought, action, and reflection-in other words, a praxiological cycle. We build on Freire and contend that critical consciousness is developed through the struggle against internal neocolonialism both in the classroom and the larger social context. Critical pedagogy has put forth the notion that classroom practice integrates particular curriculum content and design, instructional strategies and techniques, and forms of evaluation. It argues that these specify a particular version about what knowledge is of most worth, what it means to know something, and how we might construct a representation of our world and our place within it (McLaren 1998). From this perspective, the pedagogical is inherently political. For us a decolonizing pedagogy encompasses both an anticolonial and decolonizing notion of pedagogy and an anticolonial and decolonizing pedagogical praxis. It is an anticolonial and decolonizing theory and praxis that insists that colonial domination and its ideological frameworks operate and are reproduced in and through the curricular content and design, the instructional practices, the social organization of learning, and the forms of evaluation that inexorably sort and label students into enduring categories of success and failure of schooling. Thus, an anticolonial and decolonizing pedagogical praxis explicitly works to transform these dimensions of schooling so that schools become sites for the development of a critical decolonizing consciousness and activity that work to ameliorate and ultimately end the mutually constitutive forms of violence that characterize our internal neocolonial condition. For us, a decolonizing pedagogy addresses both the means and the ends of schooling.

#### And, critical pedagogy is the strongest internal link into education in any context—class relations are present within any discussion. Trifonas 03 continues,

PETER PERICLES TRIFONAS. PEDAGOGIES OF DIFFERENCE: RETHINKING EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE/ RoutledgeFalmer. New York, London. 2003. Questia.

If we superimpose my formulation of “power as relation” on the discussion concerning race, gender, class, and ability as relations, we then begin to see how we may work with social differences simultaneously. When I assert that sexism, racism, and classism are relations of domination and subordination, I imply that they are relations of power. In an educational context, the exercise of power is accomplished in interactions (i.e., in a social organization), manifesting itself as acts of exclusion, marginalization, silencing, and so forth. Thus, paying attention to how power operates along axes of gender, race, class, and ability (that is, recognizing that social differences are not given, but are accomplished in and through educational settings) is a step toward educational equity. What does the above discussion mean in the educational context? It means that in the interactions of teachers with students in the classroom, or in other contexts, attention needs to be directed toward how dominant and subordinate relations (be they based on race, gender, class, or ability) permeate these contexts and intersect in complicated ways to produce inequality and marginalization. The frequently used and well-meaning phrase, “I treat everyone the same, ” often used by teachers and administrators to indicate their lack of bias in a diverse educational setting, in fact masks unequal power relations. Similarly, educational policies that assume that people are the same or equal may serve to entrench existing inequality precisely because people enter into the educational process with different and unequal experiences. These attempts, well meaning though they may be, tend to render inequality invisible, and thus work against equity in education. In her exploration of white privilege in higher education in the United States, Frances Rains (1998), an aboriginal-Japanese American woman, states emphatically that these benign acts are disempowering for the minority person because they erase his or her racial identity. The denial of racism in this case is in fact a form of racism. Thus, in moving toward equity in education that allows us to address multiple and intersecting axes of difference and inequality, I recommend that we try to think and act “against the grain” in developing educational policies and handling various kinds of pedagogical situations. 5 To work against the grain is to recognize that education is not neutral; it is contested. Mohanty puts it as such: … [E]ducation represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations. [It is] a central terrain where power and politics operate out of the lived culture of individuals and groups situated in asymmetrical social and political positions. (Mohanty 1990:184) We need to develop a critical awareness of the power dynamics operative in institutional relations-and of the fact that people participate in institutions as unequal subjects. Working against the grain is to take a proactive approach to understanding and acting upon institutional relations, whether in the classroom, in other interactions with students, or in policy development. Rather than overlooking the embeddedness of gender, race, class, ability, and other forms of inequality that shape our interactions, working against the grain makes explicit the political nature of education and how power operates to privilege, silence, and marginalize individuals who are differently located in the educational process. In her exploration of feminist pedagogy, Linda Briskin (1990) makes a clear distinction between nonsexist and antisexist education critical to our understanding here. She asserts that nonsexism is an approach that attempts to neutralize sexual inequality by pretending that gender can be made irrelevant in the classroom. Thus, for instance, merely asserting that male and female students should have equal time to speak-and indeed giving them equal time-cannot adequately rectify the endemic problem of sexism in the classroom. One of Briskin's students reported that in her political science tutorials that when the male students spoke, everyone paid attention. When a female student spoke, however, the class acted as if no one was speaking (13). Neutrality is an attempt to conceal the unequal distribution of power. An against the grain approach would acknowledge explicitly that we are all gendered, racialized, and differently constructed subjects who do not participate in interactional relations as equals. This goes beyond formulating sexism, racism, abilism, and class privilege in individualist terms and treating them as if they were personal attitudes. Terry Wolverton (1983) discovered the difference between nonracism and antiracism in her consciousness-raising attempt: I had confused the act of trying to appear not to be racist with actively working to eliminate racism. Trying to appear not racist had made me deny my racism, and therefore exclude the possibility of change. (191) Being against the grain means seeing inequality as systemic and interpersonal (rather than individual), and combatting oppression as a collective responsibility, not just as a personal attribute (so that somehow a person can cleanse herself or himself of sexism, racism, abilism, or class bias). It is to pay attention to oppression as an interactional property that can be altered (see Manners 1998). Roger Simon (1993) suggests, in his development of a philosophical basis for teaching against the grain, which shares many commonalities in how I think about an integrative approach to equity in education, that teaching against the grain is fundamentally a moral practice. By this he does not mean that teachers simply fulfill the mandate and guidelines of school authorities. He believes that teachers must expose thepartial and imperfect nature of existing knowledge, which is constructed on the basis of asymmetrical power relations (for instance, who has the power to speak and whose voices are suppressed?). It is the responsibility of the teacher or educator to show how dominant forms of knowledge and ways of knowing constrict human capacities. In exposing the power relations integral to the knowledge construction process, the educator, by extension, must treat teaching and learning as a mutual and collaborative act between teachers and students. What may this ideal look like in practice? Marilyn Cochran-Smith (1991) also explores the notion of teaching against the grain in her research on how teachers and students worked together in a preservice program in the Philadelphia area. Borrowing from Gramsci's formulation that action is everyone's responsibility, she asserts that teaching is fundamentally a political activity. In practical terms, she outlines what it may mean to teach against the grain in an actual teaching and learning situation. Her succinct articulation is worth quoting at length: To teach against the grain, teachers have to understand and work both within and around the culture of teaching and the politics of schooling at their particular schools and within their larger school system and communities. They cannot simply announce better ways of doing things, as outsiders are likely to do. They have to teach differently without judging the ways other teach or dismissing the ideas others espouse…. [They] are not at liberty to publicly announce brilliant but excoriating critiques of their colleagues and the bureaucracies in which they labor. Their ultimate commitment is to the school lives and futures of the children with whom they live and work. Without condescension or defensiveness, they have to work with parents and other teachers on different ways of seeing and measuring development, connecting and dividing knowledge, and knowing about teaching and schooling. They have to be astute observers of individual learners with the ability to pose and explore questions that transcend cultural attribution, institutional habit, and the alleged certainty of outside experts. They have to see beyond and through the conventional labels and practices that sustain the status quo by raising unanswerable and often uncomfortable questions. Perhaps most importantly, teachers who work against the grain must name and wrestle with their own doubts, must fend off the fatigue of reform and depend on the strength of their individual and collaborative convictions that their work ultimately makes a difference in the fabric of social responsibility. (Cochran-Smith 1991:284-85) For me, to be against the grain is therefore to recognize that the routinized courses of action and interactions in all educational contexts are imbued with unequal distribution of power that produce and reinforce various forms of marginalization and exclusion. Thus, a commitment to redress these power relations (i.e., equity in education) involves interventions and actions that may appear “counter-intuitive.” 6 Undoing inequality and achieving equity in education is a risky and uncomfortable act because we need to disrupt the ways things are “normally” done. This involves a serious (and frequently threatening) effort to interrogate our privilege as well as our powerlessness. It obliges us to examine our own privilege relative though it may be, to move out of our internalized positions as victims, to take control over our lives, and to take responsibilities for change. It requires us to question what we take for granted, and a commitment to a vision of society built on reflection, reform, mutuality, and respect in theory and in practice. Teaching and learning against the grain is not easy, comfortable, or safe. It is protracted, difficult, uncomfortable, painful, and risky. It involves struggles with our colleagues, our students, as well as struggles within ourselves against our internalized beliefs and normalized behaviors. In other words, it is a lifelong challenge. However, as Simon (1993) puts it, teaching against the grain is also a project of hope. We engage in it with the knowledge and conviction that we are in a long-term collaborative project with like-minded people whose goal is to make the world a better place for us and for our children.

### Extra

#### Minimum wage advocacy has normalized and strengthened racism and exclusion of black workers. Hutchinson 97

Harry Hutchison, Law Professor University of Detroit, 1997, "Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes," Harvard Journal on Legislation, Winter, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 93, p. 129-31

While the minimum wage has been supported as a major component of the "progressive" paradigm, with vivid claims of good intentions, morality, and even on grounds of civil rights, in reality many minimum wage proponents are perpetuating a tradition of exclusionary preferences. Contextually, the United States, like South Africa, has a history of discriminatory treatment of African American workers. [n218](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n218) In South Africa, mine workers and "poor whites" encouraged the government to adopt policies favoring whites at the expense of blacks and colored workers. [n219](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n219) In the context of African American workers and U.S. labor unions, this theory of "split" or segmented labor markets "can explain a great deal about the origins of the discriminatory employment policies that developed in the United States and South Africa." [n220](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n220) Unions, workers, and employers have been major sources of dominance and marginalization of African American workers. [n221](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n221) A major goal of CRT scholarship is "to elucidate the ways in which those in power have socially constructed the very concept of race over time; that is, the extent to which white power has transformed certain differences in color, culture, behavior and outlook into hierarchies of privilege and subordination." [n222](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n222) The historical record of American labor unions, coupled with their minimum wage advocacy as informed by a wrenching yet similar record in South Africa, vindicates and re-emphasizes Derrick Bell's observation that racial discrimination facilitates the exploitation of African Americans, denies them access to benefits and opportunities that would otherwise be available, and blames all the manifestations of exclusion bred by despair on the asserted inferiority of the victims. [n223](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n223) Far from being a countermajoritarian force for inclusive social change, labor union minimum wage advocacy both in the United States and South Africa is inseparable from a history that has enforced a majoritarianism that decisively conceives of African Americans and other minorities as inferior outsiders. [n224](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n224) This commitment to a hierarchical labor market strays dramatically from the Critical Legal Studies dream of workplace equality. [n225](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n225) Indeed, it exposes as myth the claim that unions and workers are a force for egalitarianism. Minimum wages and other exclusionary devices, linked to a commitment to subordination and white supremacy, call for searching scrutiny of the effect, [n226](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n226) intent, and neutrality of such laws. As the South African experience illustrates, one of the most effective vehicles for excluding non-whites is a statute or industry-wide agreement that imposes a minimum wage. Market interference in the form of minimum wages may be promoted where it is perceived that employers may employ outsiders, such as South African blacks or African Americans, instead of whites. [n228](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n228) Minimum wages, then, are the assertedly neutral analog to intentional discrimination that marginalizes non-whites. The exclusionary capacity of minimum wage regimes can equal or surpass the efficacy of a direct race-based job reservation system. [n229](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n229) To the extent that minimum wage supporters (union and non-union) have tacitly internalized exclusionary preferences, their participation fortifies the institutionalization of subordination. The avowed "belief" that minimum wage statutes are moral and progressive, notwithstanding the fact that wage rate regulation has a disparate effect on African Americans, is not credible. Legal sanction [n230](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.76954.12589692141&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T21059314902&parent=docview&rand=1417475905562&reloadEntirePage=true#n230) is required to preclude the perpetuation of morally indefensible exclusionary regimes.

#### Historically, living wages were a mechanism to allow men in the labor force to separate themselves from prostitutes and slaves. Levin-Waldman 05

Oren M. Levin-Waldman, Public Affairs Professor - Metropolitan College of New York, 2005, The Political Economy of the Living Wage: A Study of Four Cities, p. 39

But the notion that work was indeed respectable was also a gospel of the Protestant bourgeoisie, which held that work made men useful in a world in which there was also economic scarcity. The notion that individuals were free to work meant that they were also empowered to live lives of independence, and this independence included the potential to acquire their own wealth. The problem, however, was that the rise of industrialization upset assumptions that hard work would necessarily result in success. An economy now revolving around factories challenged each of the certainties upon which the work ethic rested and also unsettled the easy equation of work and morality that existed in the minds of many. Work in the factories, at the beck and call of owners, no longer appeared to be that which one did of one's free will. The worker no longer felt as though he owned his own labor; rather he was selling it to somebody else for a pittance, and while in that somebody else's employ he was in fact controlled. Lawrence Glickman argues that most workers, especially organized workers, who sold their labor on the market -- that is, people who earned wages -- lost ownership of themselves to someone else who the had a great amount of power over them. Given how wage workers were viewed within the context of the republican tradition, workers felt that they had lost control The economic transformation that were taking place also effectively subverted the gender system within the working class in the sense that men in their employment situations assumed a dependent status analogous to women in the home. Men forced to work for wages were no loner able to see themselves as independent citizens, but in effect became children, or even "wage slaves," in much the same way as women. Because wages were so low, men who worked for wages saw themselves as no different from prostitutes. The concept of a living wage, however, would enable them to rise about the shameful image of a prostitute. Social reformers and labor leaders who advocated living wages during the late part of the nineteenth century viewed the living wage as that which would enable workers to achieve full citizenship. One could be independent only to the extent that one could control one's own labor. Those forced to work for others, to in fact work for wages, lost control of their labor and hence themselves. By this notion then, wage labor was just another version of slavery.